Unlike Graham, I don’t think neuroscience has to be reductive. I talk about parts of the brain and neurochemicals when describing play, but I only see this as identifying the networks involved in particular experiences. It doesn’t tell you everything, but it doesn’t tell you nothing – and in particular it *does* give you ways to investigate beyond mere self-report. Graham seems to equate neuroscience with eliminative materialism – the kind associated with Paul and Patricia Churchland. But I work happily in this space without any kind of materialist or reductive presumptions or methods, and I doubt I’m alone.

The prevailing trend within neuroscience may be in that direction, but as long as the scientists do their job right we always have the capacity to separate what they say from what they do – as Latour has it, the experimental networks allow entities to ‘speak’. This is often more useful than what the researchers think they hear. :)

All the best!